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Financial markets that function well are crucial for the long-run economic growth of a country. 
This paper, in the first instance, looks at how the financial development of an economy can 
be measured. It then traces the financial development of India through the 1990s to the 
present, assessing the development of each segment of financial markets. In doing so, it 
highlights the dualistic development of the financial sector.  Finally, the paper  makes an 
attempt to offer an explanation of this dualistic development and proposes a road map for 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is well recognized in economic literature that efficient and developed financial markets can 
lead to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of 
savings in the economy. Better functioning financial systems ease the external financing 
constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion. There is a growing body of empirical 
analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country studies, and 
cross-country comparisons, that prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of 
the financial system and long-run economic growth. Specifically, financial systems facilitate 
the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk. In addition,  they better allocate 
resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services.
1
India is one of the five countries classified as big emerging market economies by the World 
Bank. This list  also  includes  People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Brazil,  and 
Russia. These countries have made the critical transition from a developing country to an 
emerging market. The World Bank has predicted that these five biggest emerging markets’ 
share of world output will have more than doubled from 7.8% in 1992 to 16.1% by 2020.
 Thus  well-functioning financial markets are critical, 
especially for emerging market economies (EMEs). 
2
The first section of this chapter explores how financial development of an economy can be 
measured. Using mainly the World Economic Forum  (WEF) financial development 
indicators,  one can  see where emerging  market  economies (EMEs) stand in terms of 
domestic financial development vis-à-vis the developed economies and where India stands 
among the EMEs in the area of financial development. The second section traces the 
financial development of India through the 1990s to the present, looking at each segment of 
the financial markets and comparing development indicators with those of peer countries. 
This analysis highlights the dualistic development of the financial sector in India. The final 
section  attempts  to explain  this dualism and sets a roadmap for future development of 
financial markets in India. 
 On 
account of its size and improved economic performance in the last decade or so, India is 
contributing significantly to the increase in trade and economic activity, and thus to world 
economic growth. Hence it is important to look at the manner in which financial development 
has occurred in India and how it has been instrumental in shaping the contours of India’s 
economic progress and in turn shaped by it. It will also be instructive to study what more 
India must do to join the league of countries known for their efficient financial sectors and 
markets. 
2.  MEASURING FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Different sets of indicators have been used in attempts to measure the financial development 
of economies. Starting in 1999, the World Bank began publishing a database on financial 
development and structure across countries. The most recent World Bank study updates 
and expands the financial development and structure database.
3
                                                 
1 Levine (1997). 
 This database has a select 
number of financial system indicators (around thirty) including: 
2 World Bank (1997). 
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2 
i.  indicators for the size of the financial system, including liquid liabilities to GDP, 
currency outside banking system to base money, financial system deposits to 
GDP, and so forth; 
ii.  banking system indicators for size, structure, and stability; 
iii.  indicators for capital markets and the insurance sector; and 
iv.  indicators for financial globalization, such as international debt to GDP and     
remittance inflow to GDP. 
However, this database does not rank countries on financial development indicators. 
Other studies by the World Bank provide indicators on regulation and supervision of banks, 
coverage and structure of deposit insurance schemes, and indicators of barriers to banking 
access in developing and developed countries.
4
In another attempt to measure financial development, an occasional paper of the European 
Central Bank constructs, on the basis of an original methodology and database, composite 
indexes to measure domestic financial development in twenty-six emerging economies for 
2008, using mature economies as a benchmark.
 
5 The study uses twenty-two  variables, 
grouped according to three broad dimensions: institutions and regulations,  size of and 
access to financial markets, and market performance. According to this index, Republic of 
Korea is ranked sixth among thirty countries, PRC is fourteenth, and India ranks twenty-
second. This paper finds that India performed relatively better as regards its financial 
markets and nonbank institutions but requires improvements in the business environment as 
well as bigger and more efficient banks.
6
Recognizing that there is a  lack of consensus  on how to define and measure financial 
system development, the WEF  released its first annual Financial Development Report 




                                                 
4 One of the databases of the World Bank Group (of the International Financial Corporation) is the Doing 
Business database, which provides a quantitative measure of regulations for starting a business, getting credit, 
protecting investors, and the like. This database has a number of limitations and hence does not fully capture 
the financial development of a country. See www.doingbusiness.org. 
 The 2009 FDR ranks fifty-five countries based on over 120 variables spanning 
institutional and business environments, financial stability, and size and depth of capital 
5 Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel, and Santabárbara (2009). 
6 The domestic financial development index calculated in Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel, and Santabárbara (2009) 
captures three dimensions of financial markets. First, there is the institutional dimension, which includes the 
regulatory and judicial framework and the quality of institutions. Second is the market dimension, which 
includes the traditional measures of size and access to finance (stock market value as a percentage of GDP, 
private bond market as a percentage of GDP, total bank claims as a percentage of GDP, and assets of 
nonbank financial institutions as a percentage of GDP); financial innovation; and residents’ access to finance. 
The third dimension is market performance, including measures of technical efficiency, liquidity, and 
distribution of domestic assets base. 
7 WEF (2008). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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markets, among others, and is thus one of the most comprehensive databases available on 
financial development.
8
For the purposes of the 2009 FDR and its index, financial development is defined as “the 
factors, policies, and institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, 
and deep and broad access to capital and financial services.”
 
9
i.  Factors, policies, and institutions:  the “inputs” that  allow the development of 
financial intermediaries, markets, instruments, and services. This comprises three 
pillars: institutional environment, business environment, and financial stability. 
 In  accordance with this 
definition, the FDR recognizes various aspects of development of a financial system, 
presenting them as the “seven pillars” of the financial development index (FDI). These fall 
into three broad categories: 
ii.  Financial intermediation: the variety, size, depth, and efficiency of the financial 
intermediaries and markets that provide financial services. This includes three 
more pillars: banks, nonbank entities, and financial markets. 
iii.  Financial access: the last pillar, related to access of individuals and businesses to 
different forms of capital and financial services.
10
One of the key design principles of the FDI is the inclusion of a large number of variables 
relevant to the financial development of both emerging and developed economies. Emphasis 
is placed on the component parts of the FDI as a framework for analysis, following which a 
very conservative approach has been taken to the weighting of variables. The  FDR has 
generally weighted different components of the index equally. Standardization is done to 
permit aggregation and cross-country comparisons. This is accomplished by rescaling the 
variables on a 1–7 scale, 1 being the least advantageous to financial development and 7 
being the most advantageous. In some instances, the interaction among different variables 
is also captured because certain variables can be considered more beneficial in impact in 
the presence of others. 
 
The FDI developed by the WEF, like other such indexes on financial development, has many 
limitations, both conceptual and methodological as well as data related. The FDR recognizes 
that limitations also exist due to the  rapidly changing environment and the unique 
circumstances of some of the economies covered. Yet, in its attempt to establish a 
comprehensive framework and a means for benchmarking, it provides a useful starting point. 
The FDR is unique in the comprehensiveness of the framework it provides and the richness 
of relevant data it brings to bear on financial system development. 
                                                 
8 WEF (2009). 
9 WEF (2009, p. xiii). 
10 WEF (2009, appendix A). The subpillars under each of the seven pillars of the FDI are, for the institutional 
environment: financial sector liberalization, corporate governance, legal and regulatory issues, and contract 
enforcement; for the business environment: human capital, taxes, infrastructure, and cost of doing business; 
for financial stability: currency stability, banking system stability, and risk of sovereign debt crisis; for banking 
financial services: size index, efficiency index, and financial information disclosure; for nonbanking financial 
services:  initial public offering activity, merger and acquisition activity, insurance, and securitization; for 
financial markets: foreign exchange markets, derivatives markets, equity market development, and bond 
market development; and for financial access: commercial access and retail access. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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The 2009 FDR places most of the developed countries in the top rankings, with the United 
Kingdom holding the first rank. Among the emerging economies, Malaysia places at the top, 
ranking twenty-second, followed by Republic of Korea and PRC. India is thirty-eighth in its 
overall ranking.
11
Table 1: Rankings of Select Emerging Economies, 2009 
 Table  1  presents  India’s  rankings on various financial development 
parameters vis-à-vis other important emerging markets. 
 Country  Overall 
rank 













Malaysia  22  22  30  13  12  25  29  22 
Republic of 
Korea 




26  35  40  23  10  12  26  30 
South Africa  32  27  36  31  30  32  30  47 
Brazil  34  42  47  15  35  15  37  31 
Thailand  35  33  31  36  34  47  36  29 
India  38  48  48  46  39  17  22  48 
Russia  40  53  34  39  55  4  41  49 
Source: WEF (2009). 
It would a fair summary to say that as per these reports, based on reasonably standard and 
agreed criteria, India does not rank very high in its overall score of financial development. 
However, it is relatively well placed in terms of development of nonbanking financial services 
(seventeenth) and financial markets (twenty-second).
12
3.  FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 
 Within the financial markets, India 
fairs well in development of its foreign exchange markets and derivatives markets. Some of 
the subindicators in which India ranks well are regulation of securities exchanges (ninth) and 
currency stability (tenth). However, the country’s institutional environment is considerably 
weaker,  ranking  forty-eighth,  a consequence of  its lower levels of financial sector 
liberalization as well as a low degree of contract enforcement. India’s business environment 
is also affected by two particular challenges: an absence of adequate infrastructure and the 
high cost of doing business. These areas of difficulty translate into highly constrained 
financial access. 
Table 2 summarizes some select macroeconomic indicators of the Indian economy. The 
highlights of India’s growth story since the 1990s have been: 
i.  an average GDP growth rate of 7.2% achieved over 2000–01 to 2008–09, with an 
increasing share of services in GDP; 
ii.  high GDP growth driven by domestic demand, both consumption and investment; 
                                                 
11 India ranked thirty-one out of fifty-two countries in the 2008 FDR (WEF 2008). 
12 Nonbanking financial companies, as per the definition in the FDRs, include initial public offering activity, merger 
and acquisition activity, insurance, and securitization. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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iii.  a high average savings rate of 30.3 and an  investment rate of 30.4 as a 
percentage of GDP over the 2000–01 to 2008–09 period; and 
iv.  increasingly  important  external trade and external capital flows,  as evidenced 
from the share of merchandise trade to GDP increasing to 35% in 2007–08 from 
23.7% in 2006–07. Likewise, two-way gross capital flows as a share of GDP were 
41.8% during the 1990s and increased to 77.9% over 2000–09. They stood at 
112.4% in 2008–09. 
Table 2: Select Macroeconomic Indicators, India, 1951–2009 













Average GDP growth   3.6   5.7   7.2 
Agriculture   53.4  28.4  20.5 
Services  29.7  51.5  54.4 
Gross domestic saving rate   9.8  23.0  30.3 
Gross fixed capital formation rate   11.1  23.6  30.2 
Total foreign trade  13.3  19.6  35.7 
Two-way gross capital flows  n.a.  41.8  77.9 
Source: Central Statistical Organization, Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
With acceleration in economic growth and a significant increase in savings and investments 
in the country, a discussion on the role of finance becomes important as this can have major 
policy implications. To be able to appreciate the linkage between growth and financial 
development, I first trace out the historical evolution of financial markets in the country. 
3.1  Historical Evolution of Financial Markets 
The financial system and infrastructure of a country, at a given point in time, is the result of 
its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is shaped by the continuous interaction 
between all the players in the system and public policy interventions over time. These policy 
interventions are also a reflection of the thinking of regulators and governments of the time 
as to the acceptable and desirable balance between innovation and stability, and between 
the role of state and the markets. 
The evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed  a 
similar path. For instance, India began with the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as 
the banking sector regulator, and the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other 
financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies are 
now in place. The role of regulators has evolved over time from that of an instrument for 
planned development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and 
complex financial sector at present. 
Over this period, a variety of financial sector reform measures have been undertaken in 
India, with many important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the 
attempt of the authorities to align the regulatory framework with international best practices, ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
 
6 
keeping in view the needs of the country and domestic factors. These reforms can be 
broadly classified as steps taken towards: 
i.  liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which 
financial sector institutions function, 
ii.  strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness, 
and  
iii.  establishing and strengthening the regulatory framework and institutions for 
overseeing the financial system. 
The following pages display, in tabular format, the developments that have taken place in 
each of the segment of the financial market, namely, securities, debt, foreign exchange, 
banking, and insurance, and also make an assessment of growth and development in each 
of these segments. 
3.2  Securities Markets 
Table 3 outlines the status of the securities markets before 1992 and by 2009. 
Table 3: Developments in Securities Markets, pre-1992 versus 2009 
Features  Pre-1992   2009 
Regulator  No specific regulator, but 
central government 
oversight  
A specialized regulator for securities market 
(SEBI) created in 1992, vested with the powers 
to protect investors’ interest and to develop and 
regulate securities market. SROs strengthened 
Securities   Limited number of 
traditional instruments 
Expanded to cover government securities, units 
of CISs and MFs, derivatives of securities, 
security receipts  




Merit-based regulation  Disclosure-based regulation (1992) 
Intermediaries  Some of the intermediaries 
(stock brokers, 
authorized clerks) 
regulated by the SROs 
A variety of specialized intermediaries emerged. 
They are registered and regulated by SEBI 
(also by SROs in some instances). They as well 
as their employees are required to follow a code 
of conduct and are subject to a number of 
compliances. All participants are identified by a 
unique identification number 
Access to market  Granted by the central 
government 
Eligible issuers access the market after 
complying with the issue requirements as 
detailed in regulations under the SEBI Act, 1992 
Disclosure  Voluntary, vague, scanty 
and nonstandardized 




Determined by the central 
government 
Determined by market, either by the issuer 
through fixed price or by the investors through 




No access   Corporations allowed to issue ADRs and GDRs 
and raise ECBs. ADRs and GDRs have 
limited two-way fungibility. MFs also allowed 
to invest overseas 
Foreign institutional investors allowed to trade in 
Indian markets  ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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Features  Pre-1992   2009 
Corporate 
compliance 
Very little emphasis  Emphasis on disclosures, accounting standards, 
and corporate governance 
Mutual funds   Restricted to public sector  Open to private sector and emergence of a 





For-profit corporate, demutualized exchanges 
mandated through legislative amendments in 
the securities legislation (2004) 
Trading 
mechanism 
Open outcry, available at 
the trading rings of the 
exchanges; opaque, 
auction or negotiated 
deals 
Screen-based trading system; orders are 
matched on price-time priority; transparent 
trading platform accessible from all over the 
country 
Aggregation of 
order flow  
Market fragmented by 
geographic distance;  
order flow unobserved 
Order flow observed. The exchanges have open 
electronic consolidated limit order book 
Anonymity in 
trading 
Absent  Complete 
Settlement cycle  14-day account period 
settlement, not always 
followed  
Rolling settlement on T+2 basis (1999–2000) 
Counterparty risk  Present  Absent with clearing corporations and clearing 
houses acting as central counterparty 
Form of settlement  Physical  Mostly electronic 
Basis of 
settlement 
Bilateral netting  Multilateral netting 
Transfer of 
securities 
Cumbersome. Transfer by 
endorsement on security 
and registration by issuer 
Securities are freely transferable. Transfers are 




No focus on risk 
management 
Comprehensive risk management system at the 
exchanges  encompassing capital adequacy, 
limits on exposure and turnover, VaR-based 
margining, client-level gross margining, on-line 
position monitoring, business continuity plans, 
and the like 
Derivatives trading  Absent  A wide array of exchange-traded derivatives, 
such as futures and options on indexes and 
single stocks and futures on interest rates 
(available since 2000–01 and ongoing), 
commodities (since 2003), and currencies 
(since 2008) 
Research  Very little  Many market participants have full-fledged 
research departments. Some of them have 
schemes  and initiatives to promote research 
Source: Author 
Notes: ADRs, American depository receipts; CISs, collective investment schemes; ECBs, external commercial 
borrowings; GDRs, global depository receipts; MFs, mutual funds; SEBI, Securities and Exchange Board of India; 
SROs, self-regulatory organizations; VaR, value at risk. 
3.2.1   Equity Markets 
Though India has, in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), one of the oldest stock exchanges 
in Asia and the world, the country’s modern securities market history really starts only in the 
1990s. In this period, starting in the mid-1990s, the Indian securities market has many “firsts” 
to its credit. It established one of the first demutualized stock exchanges in the world. All ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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stock exchanges in India today are corporatized and demutualized. The Indian securities 
market was the first to use satellite-based communication technology for securities 
transactions. It was the first to  introduce straight  through processing in securities 
transactions. The growing number of market participants; the growth in volumes in securities 
transactions; the reduction in transaction costs; the significant improvements in efficiency, 
transparency,  and safety;  and the level of compliance with international standards have 
earned for the Indian securities market a new respect among the securities markets in the 
world. 
In addition to these developments, thanks to the massive liberalization ushered in 1992, the 
securities market in India has  grown exponentially as measured in terms of the  amount 
raised from the market, number of market participants, number of listed stocks, market 
capitalization, trading volumes and turnover on stock exchanges, and investor population. 
Table 4 presents some statistics pertaining to the securities markets in India. 
Table 4: Profile of Indian Securities Markets, 2000–09
a 
Millions of US dollars, unless otherwise indicated 
Description  2000–01  2007–08  2008–09 
Amount raised by government  27,548  55,763  46,093 
Amount raised domestically by  corporate 
sector 
15,909  58,383  25,859 
Amount raised through euro issues  900  6,644  940 
Amount raised by mutual funds  2,387  38,479  -5554 
Assets under management of mutual 
funds at the end of year 
19,423  126,383  81,904 
Market capitalization at the end of year  164,851  1,286,307  607,061 
Turnover in cash segment  617,708  1,283,667  756,054 
Impact cost (for a trade of Rs 0.5 crore at 
NSE), in %
b 
0.28  0.09  0.08 
Trading costs, in basis points   114   53   56 
Net cumulative investment by FIIs at the 
end of year, in billions of U.S. dollars
c  
13.4  68  56.7 
Millions of investor accounts with 
depositories at the end of year 
3.8  14.2  15.2 
Sources: RBI, Securities and Exchange Board of India, and the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE). 
Notes: a) All conversions from Indian rupee (Rs) to US dollars for a particular fiscal year are made at the exchange 
rate prevailing on March 31 of that fiscal year; b) A “crore” is an Indian unit equaling 10 million; c) FIIs, foreign 
institutional investors. 
According to the 2009 Global Stock Markets Factbook, India ranked thirteenth in the world in 
terms of total market capitalization (US$645 billion) and total value traded (US$1,050 billion) 
in 2008.
13
3.2.2  Equity Derivatives Markets 
 It ranked second in terms of the number of listed companies, exceeded only by 
United States. However, India is still far behind PRC in terms of market capitalization and 
turnover, while it scores well above the other EMEs on these equity market indicators. 
India’s tryst with exchange-traded equity derivatives began only in this century. Trading first 
commenced in index futures contracts, followed by index options in June 2001, individual 
stocks options in July 2001, and single stocks futures in November 2001. Since then, equity 
derivatives have come a long way. An expanding list of eligible investors, rising volumes, 
and the best of risk management framework for exchange-traded derivatives have been the 
hallmarks of the history of equity derivatives in India so far. 
                                                 
13 Standard and Poor’s (2009). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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India’s experience with the launch of the  equity derivatives market has been extremely 
positive. The derivatives turnover on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE)  has 
surpassed the equity market turnover within four years of the introduction of derivatives.
14
Table 5: Growth in Derivative Markets, 2000–09 
Units as indicated 
 
The turnover of derivatives (on the  NSE and BSE) increased from Rs 40,380 million 
(US$0.87 billion) in 2000–01 to Rs 110,227,482 million (US$2,163 billion) in 2008–09 (table 
5). 
Year 
No. of contracts 
traded 




Turnover        
(US$ millions) 
2000–01  168,323  40,380  n.a.  866 
2003–04  57,269,034  21,431,012  71,891  493,916 
2006–07  218,428,742  74,152,774  386,830  1,701,142 
2008–09  657,906,085  110,227,482  577,050  2,163,444 
Source: Securities and Exchange Board of India 
In terms of the number of single stock futures contracts traded in 2008, the NSE held the 
second position in the world in 2008; it was fourth in the number of stock index options 
contracts traded and third in the number of stock index futures contracts.
15 In terms of traded 
volumes in futures and options taken together, the NSE has been improving its worldwide 
ranking from fifteenth in 2006 to ninth in 2007 and eighth in 2008.
16
Thus India is one of the most successful developing countries in terms of a vibrant market 
for exchange-traded equity derivatives. However, on the general issue of risk mitigation 
products (of which equity derivatives are just one example),  it is poignant to note that 
“innovations” have appeared in the country only after years of toil and waiting. Stock index 
futures took five years to be offered to the investors, from the time they were conceived. 
Exchange-traded  fund for gold again took four years to become a reality.  Interest  rate 
derivatives,  though launched in 2003,  did not take off mainly due to constraints on the 
participation of banks in this market and had to be relaunched in 2009. These experiences 
highlight the adverse environment for financial innovation in the country. 
 The traded volumes in 
the derivatives segment of the NSE in 2008 represented an increase of 55.4% over the 
figure for 2007. 
Another issue that deserves attention for further development of these markets is the explicit 
segmentation of markets within exchanges. As an example, the equity spot market is one 
“segment,” and the equity derivatives market is another segment. The currency derivatives 
market is yet another segment. Financial firms have to obtain separate memberships in each 
segment and suffer from a duplication of compliance costs. This separation also reduces the 
ability of a clearing corporation to know the full position of a financial firm or its customers, 
and the risk that the firm poses to the system. 
3.3  Debt Markets 
The following analysis evaluates the performance of three components of the debt market: 
money markets, government securities markets, and corporate debt markets. 
                                                 
14 The NSE is a premier stock exchange of the country, accounting for 99 % of trading in the derivatives segment. 
15 These rankings are based on World Federation of Exchanges (2008). 
16 Futures Industry Association (2009). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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3.3.1  Money Markets 
Table 6 shows the development of money markets in India in 1992 and 2009. 
Table 6: Developments in Money Markets, 1992 versus 2009 
Features  1992  2009 
Pure interbank call money 
market 
Absent  Call market transactions limited to banks and 
primary dealers only in the interest of 
financial stability, leading to development of 
pure interbank call money market 
Uncollateralized call 
money segment versus 
collateralized market 
Call money market 
largely 
uncollateralized 
Shift of activity from uncollateralized to 
collateralized segments of the market 
Repo market  Limited participants  Nonbanking financial companies, mutual 
funds, housing finance companies, and 
insurance companies not holding 
subsidiary general ledger  accounts 
permitted to undertake repo transactions 
as of March 3, 2003 
Subsequently, nonscheduled urban 
cooperative banks and listed companies 
having gilt accounts with scheduled 
commercial banks are allowed to 
participate in repo markets 
Central counterparty  Nonexistent  Clearing Corporation of India set up as a 
central counterparty for all trades involving 
foreign exchange; government securities 
and other debt instruments routed through 
it 
Source: Author 
In comparison with the early 1990s, money markets are currently better in terms of depth, 
and  as a result of  various policy initiatives, activity in all the segments has increased 
significantly, especially during the last three years (table 7). With the development of market 
repo and collateralized borrowing and lending obligation segments, the call money market 
has been transformed into a pure interbank market since August 2005. In the interest of 
financial stability, the uncollateralized overnight transactions are now limited to banks and 
primary dealers. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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2001–02  7,202  6,181  n.a.  40  13,422  1,624  194 
2005–06  4,030  4,748  4,492  187  13,458  3,875  6,119 
2006–07  4,984  7,726  7,431  232  20,372  4,927  14,901 
Source: RBI. 
Notes: a) All conversions from Indian rupees to U.S. dollars for a particular fiscal year are made at the exchange rate 
prevailing on March 31 of that fiscal year; b) Turnover is twice the single leg volumes in the case of call money and 
CBLO (collateralized borrowing and lending obligation) to capture borrowing and lending both, and four times in case 
of market repo to capture the borrowing and lending in the two legs of a repo; c) LAF, liquidity adjustment facility. 
Volatility in call rates has declined over the years, especially after the introduction of the 
liquidity adjustment facility. There also  has been a reduction in bid-ask spread in the 
overnight rates, which indicates that the Indian money market has become reasonably deep, 
vibrant, and liquid. 
However, though the money market is free from interest rate ceilings, structural barriers and 
institutional factors continue to create distortions in the market. Apart from the overnight 
interbank (call market) rate, the other interest rates in the money market are sticky and 
appear to be set in customer markets rather than auction markets. A well-defined yield curve 
does not therefore exist in the Indian money market. 
3.3.2  Government Securities Markets 
Table 8 illustrates how the government securities market has changed from 1992 to 2009. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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Table 8: Developments in Government Securities Markets, 1992 versus 2009 
Features  1992  2009 
Securities  “Plain vanilla” cash flow 
securities 
Expanded to include zero coupon bonds, 
floating rate bonds, capital indexed 
bonds, bonds with embedded 
derivatives, interest rate futures 
Form of securities  Physical  “Demat” holding by RBI-regulated entities 
Pricing of securities  Administered interest rates  Issue at market-related rates (auction) 
Participation  Captive investors (mostly 
banks) 
Expanded to allow primary dealers, FIIs, 
retail investors 
Trading mechanism  Through telephone  NDS, which provides negotiation and 
screen-based trading 
Counterparty risk  Present  Clearing Corporation of India provides 
novation and guarantees settlement 
Technological 
infrastructure 
Weak  A screen-based anonymous trading and 
reporting platform introduced in the form 
of NDS-OM, which enables electronic 
bidding in primary auctions and 
disseminates trading information with a 
minimum time lag 
Depth and liquidity  Limited  Number of measures taken to promote 
liquidity, such as introduction of “when 
issued” trading, “short selling” of 
government securities and active 
consolidation of government debt 
through buy backs. 
Source: Author 
Notes: Demat, dematerialized account; NDS, negotiated dealing system; OM, order matching segment. 
As a result of the developmental measures undertaken, the volume of transactions in 
government securities has increased manyfold over the past decade (table 9). The investor 
base, which was largely determined by mandated investment requirements before reforms, 
has expanded slightly with the voluntary holding of government securities. Accordingly, the 
share of commercial banks in holding of government securities has declined  from about 
41.5% in 2007 to 38.8% in 2009.
17
Table 9: Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, 2000–08 
Millions of US dollars 
 
Year  Turnover  
2000   129,093 
2005   571,770 
2008  1,237,993 
Source: RBI. 
Note: All conversions from Indian rupees to U.S. dollars for a particular calendar year are made at the exchange rate 
prevailing on December 31 of that year. 
                                                 
17 Figures are from the monthly bulletins of the RBI. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
 
13 
However, a number of problems continue to confront these markets. A benchmark yield 
curve for government securities has not yet emerged. Liquidity of the markets is poor, which 
impedes the development of a yield curve that can be reliably used to price all cash flows off 
the curve. Only a handful of securities account for the bulk of trading. There are isolated 
pockets of liquidity for very short term and very long term securities. In addition, there are 
limits on foreign  institutional  investor (FII) investments in government securities (at this 
writing, US$5 billion), which limit voluntary demand for them from abroad. 
A key issue for government securities markets is that the central bank is also the manager of 
public debt in the country, which leads to a series of conflicts. There is, to begin with, a 
conflict of interest between setting the short-term interest rate and selling bonds for the 
government. Furthermore, since the central bank administers the operational systems for 
these markets, it follows that the owner-administrator of these systems is also a participant 
in the market. In effect, the government securities market is a captive market, with the RBI 
mandating that banks hold a large amount of government bonds; this undermines the growth 
of a deep, liquid market in government securities with vibrant trading and speculative price 
discovery. In turn, this hampers the development of the corporate bond market as there a 
benchmark sovereign yield curve is lacking, making it difficult to price corporate bonds. 
3.3.3  Corporate Debt Markets 
Table 10 shows the change in corporate debt markets in India from 1992 to 2009. 
Table 10: Developments in Corporate Debt Markets, 1992 versus 2009 
Features  1992  2009 
Issue procedures  Cumbersome 
 
Simplified issue procedures put in place 
through regulations. Issuers required to 
make only some incremental 
disclosures every time they approach 
the market with a fresh issue either to 
the public or through a private 
placement 
Centralized database  Nonexistent  Database for new bond issuances 
operationalized  
Retail participation  Limited mainly due to high 
minimum lot size of Rs 1 
million 
The minimum market lot reduced to Rs 




Not available  Exchange-traded interest rate 
derivatives launched in 2003 and 
relaunched with certain changes in 
2009 












Arranged by counterparties 
Trade reporting platform operationalized  
 
Compulsory dematerialization in 
settlement from 2003 
 
Settlement through an exchange 
platform (from 2009) 
Source: Author 
Private bond market capitalization as percentage of GDP was 0.4%  for India in 2001, 
increasing to 2.67% in 2007. The public bond market capitalization as percentage of GDP 
was 30 % and 3% for these years, respectively. These figures indicate underdeveloped bond 
markets when compared to other emerging markets with similar financial sector depth. A 
comparison of the size and composition of the domestic debt market in India with select 
emerging market countries puts India at the bottom in terms of private bond market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP and ahead of South Africa and PRC in terms of public ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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bond market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (table 11). In India financial institutions 
and government or government-guaranteed instruments dominate most of the issuance in 
the corporate bond market, with a share of 8% and 90% of the total issuance as of the end 
of March 2009, respectively. The share of corporate issuers in the total bond issuance is 
very low at only 2%. 
Table 11: Private and Public Domestic Bond Market Capitalization as a Share of GDP, 
Various Countries, 2007 
% 
Country 
Private bond market 
capitalization
a 




India    2.67  30.97 
Republic of Korea  58.81  48.11 
South Africa  15.96  25.77 
People’s Republic 
of China 
24.46  28.13 
Thailand    16  34.72 
Russia     2.87  99.62 
Brazil  16.92  46.13 
Developed markets 
United States  125.10  46.77 
United Kingdom    15.84  32.09 
Japan    38.79  159.91 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure database, updated on May 2009 (http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0). 
Notes: a) Private domestic debt securities are outstanding securities issued by financial institutions and corporations, 
as a share of GDP; b) Public domestic debt securities are outstanding securities issued by government, as a share of 
GDP. 
A well-developed corporate bond market is essential for financial system efficiency, stability, 
and overall economic growth. A well-functioning bond market provides for financial 
diversification and facilitates necessary financing for corporations and infrastructure 
development. However, as noted above, this market remains practically nonexistent in India, 
imposing an avoidable constraint on India’s ability to finance its growing needs for debt, 
particularly for infrastructure development. Most of the large issuers are quasi-governmental, 
including banks, public sector oil companies, or government-sponsored financial institutions. 
Of the rest, a few known names dominate. There is very little high-yield issuance, and 
spreads between sovereign debt, AAA debt, and high-yield debt are high in comparison to 
other markets. Very few papers trade on a regular basis. Trading in most papers dries up 
after the first few days of issuance, during which the larger players “retail” the bonds they 
have picked up to smaller pension funds and cooperative banks. Most trading is between 
banks and the mutual fund companies. 
The lack of depth in the government bond market and the absence of a yield curve for 
government bonds, which could serve as a benchmark for corporate bonds; a cumbersome 
primary issuance mechanism (to some extent addressed by recent changes in the 
regulations by the market regulator, the  Securities and Exchange Board of India); the 
absence of sufficiently diversified long-term investors; and chronic illiquidity caused inter alia 
by absence of derivative instruments are some of the factors leading to underdeveloped 
bond markets. There are also limits on FII investments in corporate debt (US$15 billion at 
this writing), which are reviewed periodically. 
3.4  Foreign Exchange Markets 
Table 12 compares the state of foreign exchange markets in India in 1992 and 2009. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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Table 12: Developments in Foreign Exchange Markets, 1992 versus 2009 
 Features  1992  2009 
Exchange rate regime 
 
Single currency fixed 
exchange rate 
system 
Valuation of rupee against a basket of currencies 
and a market-determined floating exchange rate 
regime 
Convertibility of rupee  Not convertible  Full convertibility of rupee for current account 
transactions  
De facto full capital account convertibility for 
nonresidents, and calibrated liberalization of 
transactions undertaken for capital account 





Act (FERA), 1973 
FERA replaced with relatively more market friendly 
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 
Instruments in foreign 
exchange markets 
Limited  New instruments permitted, such as rupee-foreign 
currency swap, foreign currency-rupee options, 
cross-currency options, interest rate swaps, and 
forward rate agreements 




Authorized dealers permitted to initiate trading 
positions, borrow, and invest in overseas market 
Banks permitted to fix interest rates on nonresident 
deposits, use derivative products for asset-
liability management, and fix overnight open 
position limits and gap limits in the foreign 
exchange market 
Permission given to various participants in the 
foreign exchange market—including exporters, 
Indians investing abroad, FIIs—to use forward 
cover and enter into swap transactions without 
any limit, subject to genuine underlying exposure 
FIIs and nonresident Indians permitted to trade in 
equity derivative contracts on exchanges, subject 
to certain conditions 
Foreign exchange earners permitted to maintain 
foreign currency accounts; residents permitted to 
open such accounts within the general limit of 
US$25,000 a year 
Source: Author 
Reforms in foreign exchange markets have been focused on market development with built-
in prudential safeguards so that the market would not be destabilized in the process. The 
most important measures undertaken to reform these markets were the move toward a 
market-based exchange rate regime in 1993 and the subsequent adoption of current 
account convertibility. Allowing greater autonomy for  banks in their foreign exchange 
operations, admitting new players into the markets, and permitting limited introduction of new 
products have been other important reforms. 
As a result of various measures, the annual turnover in the foreign exchange market 
increased more than eightfold, from US$1,305 billion in 1997–98 to US$12,092 billion in 
2008–09. During this period, there has been a steady but slow fall in the share of spot 
transactions in total turnover in the foreign exchange markets, implying an increase in gross 
turnover in the over-the-counter (OTC)  derivatives (swaps and forwards) segment of 
currency markets. Activity in this segment has picked up,  particularly in late 2007 and 
through 2008, following increased volatility in the  U.S. dollar–rupee  exchange rate. The ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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average daily turnover, calculated on a monthly basis, reached an all-time high of US$35 
billion in September 2008. The year 2008 closed with average daily volumes of US$28.63 
billion in these markets over the full year. 
While OTC foreign exchange markets are doing well in India, the exchange-traded currency 
futures market has been introduced only in August 2008. This market, as it exists today, is 
limited exclusively to rupee–U.S. dollar contracts, with very low position limits and a ban on 
trading by nonresidents, including FIIs. Despite these restrictions, the currency  futures 
market has seen a steady growth in liquidity and now matches the spreads that are seen on 
their much longer-lived OTC forwards counterparts. There is considerable scope for further 
development of these markets by removing the aforementioned restrictions. 
3.5  Banking Sector 
Table 13 lists the developments in the banking sector from 1992 to 2009. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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Table 13: Developments in the Banking Sector, 1992 versus 2009
a 
Features  1992  2009 
Competition  Limited; predominantly 
government owned 
Increased competition with entry of foreign and 
new private banks; reduction of public 
ownership in public sector banks by allowing 
them to raise capital from equity market up to 
49% of paid-up capital 
Interest rate structure  Administered interest rates  Interest rates largely deregulated with a few 
exceptions 
Statutory pre-emption  High level of statutory 
preemption in the form of 
cash reserve ratio (CRR) 
and statutory liquidity 
ratio (SLR) requirements 
Gradual reduction of CRR and SLR requirements 
Diversification of 
activities 
Limited  Banks allowed to diversify into nontraditional 
activities 
 
Regulatory oversight  Strict oversight by RBI, 
including in day-to-day 
functioning 
Greater functional autonomy and operational 
flexibility in day-to-day activities 
Risk-based supervision introduced 
Introduction of CAMELS supervisory rating 
system 
Streamlining of the supervision process with 
combination of on-site and off-site surveillance 
along with external auditing 
Introduction of the process of structured and 
discretionary intervention for problem banks 
through a prompt corrective action mechanism 
Establishment of the Board for Financial 
Supervision as the apex supervisory authority 
for commercial banks, financial institutions, and 
nonbanking financial companies 
Products  Limited  New products and delivery channels introduced 
Debt recovery process  Prolonged and tedious  Lok adalats (people’s courts), debt recovery 
tribunals, asset reconstruction companies, 
settlement advisory committees, corporate debt 
restructuring mechanism, set up for quicker 
recovery and restructuring 
Markets for securitized 
assets 
Underdeveloped  Promulgation of the Securitization and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Securities Interest  Act, 2002, 
and its subsequent amendment to ensure 
creditor rights 
Source: Author 
The reforms mentioned above have had major impact on the overall efficiency and stability 
of the banking system in India. A select few reforms, which are critical, affect: 
i.  Capital: The average capital to risk (weighted) assets ratio (CRAR) of all banks 
increased from 9.2% as of March 31, 1994, to 13.2% as of March 31, 2009. With 
the global range for CRAR being 10.2% to 13.2%, the capital adequacy of Indian 
banks is comparable to those at the international level. 
ii.  Asset  quality:  The  RBI introduced an objective criterion  for identifying 
nonperforming assets (NPAs) in 1992–93. While gross NPAs, as a proportion of 
gross advances, have been declining steadily and distinctly over the years, the 
level of gross NPAs in absolute terms has also decreased over the recent past. 
The ratio of gross NPAs to gross advances for the banking system was 14.4% in 
March 1998 but decreased to 2.33% in March 2009. During the same period, the ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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ratio  of net NPAs to  net advances declined from 7.3% to 1.0%. The ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans was 2.3% in 2008 for India, lower than for most 
of the other EMEs. 
iii.  Profitability: The reform measures have also resulted in an improvement in the 
profitability of banks. The return on assets of all banks in India rose from 0.4% in 
the year 1991–92 to 1.0% in 2008. The return on assets of Indian banks is in the 
range 0.1% to 2.1%, which is comparable to the levels in other EMEs. 
These profitability figures mask an important fact that India is hugely underbanked. India’s 
poor, many of whom  work as agricultural and unskilled  or  semiskilled wage laborers, 
microentrepreneurs, and low-salaried workers, are largely excluded from the formal financial 
system. Over 40% of India’s working population earn but have no savings. The population 
served per bank branch in rural India is approximately 18,000 while in urban India it is 
5,000.
18
3.6  Insurance Sector 
 
Table 14 compares the development in the insurance sector in 1992 and 2009. 
Table 14: Developments in the Insurance Sector, 1992 versus 2009 
Features  1992  2009 
Regulator  No specific regulator, 
but central 
government oversight  
A specialized regulator for insurance sector (IRDA) was 
constituted in 1999 to protect the interests of 
insurance policyholders and to regulate, promote, and 
ensure orderly growth of the insurance industry. 
Products  Limited number of 
products available 
New insurance products have been introduced,  such 
as weather insurance, group health insurance for the 
poor, product liability insurance, life insurance with 
critical and terminal illness riders, and package 
insurance for small and medium enterprises. 




Only six insurance 
companies operating 
Private insurance companies were allowed back into 
the business of insurance with a maximum of 26% of 
foreign holding in 1999. 




Merit-based regulation  Disclosure-based regulation 
Source: Author 
Note: IRDA, Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority. 
The life insurance business (measured in the context of first-year premium) registered a 
year-on-year growth of 94.96% in 2006–07 and 23.88% in 2007–08. The general insurance 
business (gross direct premium) registered a growth of 11.72% in 2007–08 (versus 3.52% 
achieved in 2006–07). This has resulted in increasing insurance penetration in the country. 
Insurance penetration for the year 2007 stood at 4% for life insurance and 0.6% for nonlife 
insurance.
19
                                                 
18 Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (Planning Commission 2009). 
 The growth in the insurance industry has been spurred by product innovation, 
active distribution channels coupled with targeted publicity, and promotional campaigns by 
the insurers. 
19 Premium volume as a ratio of GDP. See Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (2008). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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When  India’s insurance industry performance is compared with that of other emerging 
markets, it apparent that Indian markets have the lowest insurance density.
20 However, in 
terms of insurance penetration, India fares better than most emerging  markets. The 
participation of low-income groups in life insurance, the second most preferred savings 
instrument after bank savings deposits, is still very limited. One-third of all paid workers have 
some life insurance protection. However, only 14% of people in the lowest income quartile 
and 26% in the second quartile have life insurance, compared to 69% of those in the highest 
income quartile. While the elaborate sales and distribution model has contributed to the 
popularity of life insurance, this has come at considerable cost by way of high commissions 
and a high percentage of lapsed policies.
21 Policy lapses are low only in the highest income 
quartile, while in all other segments, at least 20% of respondents have had a policy lapse. 
The penetration of nonlife insurance products is negligible. For example, only 1% of the 
population appears to have medical insurance.
22
The insurance industry also continues to face some basic problems. One of these is that a 
large part of the  sale of “insurance” products is merely tax arbitrage, where a fund 
management product is given preferential tax treatment under the garb of a minimal 
insurance cover. A related issue is that much of the growth in insurance penetration is as a 
result of selling of products such as unit  linked  insurance  plans (ULIPs),  which  are 
essentially a mutual fund type of securities market product. The relatively better performance 
of ULIPs could be attributed, inter alia, to higher commissions for insurance ULIPs than for 
mutual fund products. Thus there is a blurring of products wherein financial instruments are 
partaking of the multiple characteristics of investment, pensions, and insurance.  Some basic 
changes in regulatory architecture would be necessary to address this, a topic revisited later 
in the chapter. 
 
4.  AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REFORMS AND THE WAY AHEAD 
Looking both at the story of growth and development of each of the segments of financial 
markets in India described in above and the more numbers-based evidence in the first 
section, one cannot escape the fact that they point to two contradictory developments; the 
dramatic transformation of the stock market segment but the  considerably  more limited 
progress in other segments of the markets. In other words, one could broadly say that while 
India has done well in terms of creating efficient equity and equity derivatives, development 
in the banking sector services, bond markets, retail access to finance, and general business 
environment leaves much to be desired. 
                                                 
20 Ratio of premium (in U.S. dollars) to total population. 
21 For traditional life insurance products, a policyholder typically loses the entire investment if the policy lapses 
within the first three years. After that, only the surrender value is paid in the case of a lapse, which is less than 
35 % of the total premiums paid. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority reported that almost 5 
% of life insurance policies lapsed between 2000 and 2005. This number was as high as 16 % among private 
providers due to the higher contribution of unit linked insurance plans and aggressive selling policies. See 
ISEC Securities (2007, p. 43). 
22 Planning Commission (2009, pp. 53–54). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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The recently submitted report of the Government of India’s Committee on Financial Sector 
Reforms (CFSR) summarizes the state of various segments of Indian financial markets in 
terms of immediacy, depth, and resilience (see table 15).
23
Table 15: Liquidity of Indian Financial Markets 
 
Market  Immediacy  Depth  Resilience 
Large cap stocks and futures, and index futures  Y  Y  Y 
Other stocks       
On-the-run government bonds  Y  Y   
Other government bonds       
Corporate bonds       
Commercial paper and other money market 
instruments 
     
Near-money options on index and liquid stocks   Y     
Other stock options         
Currency   Y     
Interest rate swaps  Y  Y   
Metals, energies, and select agricultural 
commodity futures 
Y     
Other commodity futures       
Source: CFSR (Planning Commission 2009). 
In the view of the CFSR, resilience is found in the large stocks, their stock futures and the 
index futures. All other markets in India lack resilience. Depth is found, in addition, with on-
the-run government bonds and interest rate swaps. Immediacy is found in a few more 
markets. A well-functioning market is one that has all three elements. India has only one 
market where this has been achieved, for roughly the top 200 stocks, their derivatives, and 
index derivatives. 
The CFSR further notes that when a financial market does not exist, or is inadequately liquid 
to meet the requirements at hand, or suffers from deviations from fair price, this constitutes 
market incompleteness. Economic agents are unable to enter into transactions that they 
require for conducting their optimal plans. Market incompleteness has many destructive 
implications for resource allocation and ultimately GDP growth. 
It is pertinent to try to look for answers to this differential and dualistic development of the 
Indian financial sector by understanding what was done right in reforms in the stock markets 
and what went wrong or was not done in other areas of finance. This will then be useful in 
charting out a road map for next-generation financial sector reforms in the country. 
                                                 
23 Planning Commission (2009). Immediacy refers to the ability to execute trades of small size immediately 
without moving the price adversely (in the jargon, at low-impact cost). Depth refers to the impact cost suffered 
when doing large trades. Resilience refers to the speed with which prices and liquidity of the market revert 
back to normal conditions after a large trade has taken place. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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4.1  Diagnosis 
The extent and pace of reforms in a segment of financial markets in India appear to be 
shaped by two factors: a clearly defined regulatory framework and the extent of public sector 
presence. The debt markets in India illustrate this. The debt market has had a strong public 
sector presence. The dominant traded instruments are Government of India securities, and 
the dominant trading participants are banks, with a large fraction being the public sector 
banks. When the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was created to regulate 
“securities markets,” the markets for bonds did not fall within its mandate due to confusion in 
the financial architecture prevalent in the country. Despite the fact that the legal definition of 
the word securities included “bonds,” due to a variety of reasons, including the fact that RBI 
was the investment banker to the Government of India and the regulator of the banking 
sector (which is the dominant player in the bond market), SEBI did not become the sole 
regulator for the bond market. Even now there is legal confusion over who regulates the 
government securities market, with the RBI exercising a lot of regulatory powers. Thus the 
bond market did not benefit from an independent regulator, as the equity markets did. The 
approach of reforms in equity markets was through an independent regulator, the SEBI. 
However, the development of bond markets took place in the context of this conflict of 
jurisdiction. There were considerable lags in institutional development in the Indian debt 
markets as compared to equity and commodities markets, as demonstrated in table 16. 
Table 16: Lags in Institutional Development in the Indian Debt Market 
Institution  Original development  Adoption for debt market 
Electronic trading on a single 
platform 
Equity, 1994; commodity futures, 
2004 
2005, eleven years later 
National access to trading  Equity, 1994; commodity futures, 
2004 
Absent 
Clearing corporation  Equity, 1996  1999, three years later 
Independent regulator  Equity, 1992; insurance, 1999  Not yet even considered 
Competition between exchanges  Equity, 1994; commodities, 2004  Absent 
Entry barriers  Removed for equity, 1994; 
commodities, 2004 
Barriers present 
Source: Thomas (2006). 
Similarly, as regards the impact of public sector presence on the pace and direction of 
reforms, one finds that in India, the pace of reforms has been the slowest where the 
government  had a dominant presence. For example, the government  dominated  the 
insurance and banking sector, where the pace of the reforms has been the slowest. The 
government had a lower involvement in commodity markets, and the least in the case of 
equity, where reforms have made huge strides in institutional development and change. 
Some of the other reasons for the varying pace of development in different sectors of the 
financial markets are bans or restrictions on products and participants. A policy environment 
that bans products and markets  clearly  hinders  the  development of liquid and efficient 
markets. As an example, exchange-traded currency futures were banned until August 2008, 
and commodity options are currently  banned, obviously impeding the development of 
liquidity and efficiency in these markets. Equally problematic, a missing market can hamper 
the efficiency of other markets as well. For example, an efficient and deep corporate bond 
market is still lacking in India, inter alia, because the related markets for corporate repos, 
interest rate derivatives, and credit derivatives are either altogether missing or have only 
been allowed with multiple restrictions, which lead to stunted development. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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In many cases, while an outright product ban is not in place, there are restrictions on 
participation. These include regulatory restrictions on some kinds of activities (for example, 
banks are prohibited from adopting long positions on interest rate futures) or quantitative 
restrictions (for example, all FIIs combined are required to keep their aggregate ownership of 
corporate bonds below US$15 billion). 
The equity market—the only element of Indian finance that has achieved immediacy, depth, 
and resilience—has few restrictions on participation in both spot and derivatives markets. As 
a consequence, the equity market, especially for large stocks, has developed a distribution 
capability that reaches millions of market participants, including many around the world. All 
kinds of economic agents come together into a unified market to make the price. Competitive 
conditions hold for the most part as no one player is large enough to distort the price. The 
diverse views and needs of a  range  of participants impart resilience, depth,  and market 
efficiency. Competition between the  NSE and BSE has helped improve technology and 
reduce costs. The most important feature of the equity market has been free entry and exit 
for financial firms that become members of the NSE and BSE, and the free entry and exit for 
the economic agents who trade on these markets through exchange members. Such an 
open environment is critically important for achieving liquidity and efficiency in all the other 
elements of Indian financial markets. 
In a growing and increasingly complex market-oriented economy such as India’s, which is 
experiencing increased integration with global trade and finance, the financial system would 
be an important element in the country’s future growth trajectory. Further steps are required 
to make the financial markets deeper, more efficient, and well-regulated. In this regard, two 
recent important government committees, the High-Powered Expert Committee on Making 
Mumbai an International Financial Center (HPEC on MIFC) and the CFSR, have charted out 
the road ahead for India’s financial system to prepare it for the challenges of the future. 
Despite differences in their scope and terms of reference, the two committee reports have a 
common underlying term of reference, namely,  to recommend the  next generation of 
financial sector reforms for India. They both emphasize that recognizing the deep linkages 
among different reforms, including broader reforms to monetary and fiscal policies, are 
essential to achieve real progress.
24
4.2  Way Ahead 
 The reports outline the key elements of a financial 
system that India will need in its quest for higher growth over the next few years. 
Drawing from various expert committee reports, mentioned above, certain policy actions are 
recommended below for further development of financial markets in India. 
4.2.1  Regulatory Architecture 
As shown in Figure 1, based on a report by the World Bank quoted in the CFSR, the current 
system involves half a dozen apex regulatory agencies, apart from several ministries in the 
government that retain direct regulatory powers. This structure leads to major regulatory 
overlaps and regulatory gaps. Sometimes this structure also can lead to regulatory arbitrage 
as similar financial services may be offered by institutions that come under different 
regulators and are therefore subject to different regulatory requirements. The overlapping 
regulatory structure also becomes a barrier to innovation as any new product might need 
approval from more than one regulator. In some cases, it is not even clear which regulator 
has primary jurisdiction over the product. In addition, multiplicity of regulators creates severe 
problems  with  interagency coordination. In India these coordination mechanisms are not 
formalized, and though these mechanisms can be [effective in emergencies, they are not 
                                                 
24 See Planning Commission (2009) and HPEC on MIFC (Ministry of Finance 2007). ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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quite as effective at other times. Coordination problems are aggravated by the uneven skills 
and experience across regulators. 
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    Source: CFSR (Planning Commission 2009), from a report by the World Bank (2005). 
    a. Acronyms: EFPO, Employees’ Provident Fund Organization; FMC, Forward Markets Commission; IRDA, Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority; MoF, Ministry of 
Finance; MoSSI, Ministry of Small-Scale Industries; MoUD, Ministry of Urban Development; NABARD, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development; NBFCs, nonbank finance 
companies; NHB, National Housing Bank; PACARDBs, primary cooperative agriculture and rural development banks;    PFRDA, Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority; 




Central government ministry 
Tier 1 regulatory agencies each established through acts of parliament 
Second tier regulatory supervisory agencies, each established through acts of parliament. These institutions perform 
refinancing functions. 
Implicit role as MoF representatives are on the boards of SEBI, IRDA, RBI. Representatives of the MoF and MoSSI are also on the 
board of SIDBI, and representatives of the MoUD are on the board of NHB. The MoF is also represented on the boards of public 
sector banks, public sector development financial institutions, and life insurance and general insurance corporations. 
Explicit regulation and supervision 
Supervision but no regulatory role 
Members of the High-Level Coordination Committee on Financial Markets 
 
Regulatory structures need to be streamlined to avoid regulatory inconsistencies, gaps, 
overlap, and arbitrage. Steps in this direction should include a reduction in the number of 
regulators, defining their jurisdiction wherever possible in terms of functions rather than the 
forms of the players, and ensuring a level playing field by making all players performing a 
function report to the same regulator regardless of their size or ownership. 
As also recommended by the HPEC on MIFC and the CFSR, there is merit in moving toward 
greater convergence of financial market regulation. The important gains achievable from this 
convergence are lower transaction costs due to economies of scale and scope, regulators ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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being less prone to capture, eliminating gaps and weaknesses in regulation, greater focus 
on financial inclusion and literacy efforts,  seamless market development,  and better risk 
management for systemic stability. Another important gain of regulatory convergence is that 
it would ensure equal regulatory treatment of financial entities (in terms of authorization, 
enforcement,  or disciplinary decision) with similar risk characteristics, product lines,  and 
operating in similar markets. 
Options that can be explored to achieve greater regulatory convergence, based on 
recommendations of various government committees fall into two main categories. 
The first category concerns different degrees of convergence. One option is convergence of 
the  commodity derivatives and securities market, that is,  one regulator for the equity, 
corporate debt,  equity derivatives, and  commodity derivatives markets. Another option is 
convergence of organized financial trading, that is,  one regulator for the aforementioned 
commodity derivatives and securities market plus interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange 
derivatives, government securities, and all derivatives thereon. The third option would be 
convergence of all financial sector regulators, that is, one regulator for all of the above plus 
insurance and pensions, with the central bank retaining regulatory control over the banking 
sector.
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The second category concerns policy level convergence. This would mean that all financial 
sector regulation and regulators would be covered under a single legislative enactment and 
under a single department, even with multiple regulators. 
 
Each of these alternatives needs to be explored. 
Along with streamlining the regulatory framework, there is also a need to review the actual 
financial regulations, which tend to be “rule based” and overly prescriptive, inserting every 
minute detail into the basic legislation and including  detailed subordinated rules and 
regulations.  The suggestion here is to move toward more principles-based regulation to 
promote financial innovation and avoid the mistake of overregulation. However, even if the 
regulatory system continues to be rules based, then given the pace of financial innovation 
that a country that is growing as fast as India requires, there should definitely be a constant 
revisiting of the rules that are in place.  Otherwise, system risks getting stuck in an old set of 
rules that will restrict the pace of growth in the country.  Regulatory impact assessment could 
serve as an important tool for evaluating the costs and benefits of various aspects of the 
regulatory architecture and implementation to guard against the error of overregulation. 
4.2.2  Financial Inclusion 
A robust financial system is not as socially relevant if most people in the country do not have 
access to it. Financial inclusion is a key priority for India, especially rural India. The following 
are some recent initiatives for achieving greater financial inclusion: 
i.  The list of banking correspondents has been expanded to include individual petty, 
medical, and fair price shop owners and agents of small savings schemes of the 
Government of India, insurance companies, and retired teachers. 
ii.  Establishment of off-site ATMs has been delicensed. 
iii.  RBI is presently reviewing the priority sector lending guidelines and the feasibility 
of trading in priority sector lending certificates, as recommended by the CFSR. 
                                                 
25 The CFSR as well as the HPEC on MIFC recommend unification of all regulatory and supervisory functions 
connected with organized financial trading into a single agency, that is, the SEBI. On the issue of regulation of 
the banking sector, the CFSR recommends that all banks and any other deposit-taking entities should come 
under one supervisor, the RBI. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
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iv.  A proposal to grant a few more licenses to local area banks for a fixed period of 
time is also under consideration. 
v.  A working group of RBI has recommended removing the interest rate ceiling on 
loans up to Rs 200,000. 
Financial sector policies in India have long been driven by the objective of increasing 
financial inclusion, but universal inclusion is still quite some distance away. The past strategy 
for expanding the reach of the financial system relied primarily on expanding branching, 
setting up special-purpose government-sponsored institutions, and setting targets for credit 
to broad categories of the excluded. The success of these approaches has been mixed. A 
new strategy for financial inclusion is needed that builds on the lessons of the past. It needs 
to be recognized that financial inclusion is not only about credit but also involves providing a 
wide range of financial services, including saving accounts, insurance, and remittance 
products. Efforts at financial inclusion need to move away from sectors to segments of 
people that are excluded. Past efforts have focused largely on agriculture. As the Indian 
economy diversifies and more people move away from farming, there is an urgent need to 
focus on other segments as well, for instance, the poor in urban areas. Product innovation, 
organizational flexibility, and superior cost efficiency are essential in reaching the excluded 
and offering them financial services that they will want to use. Competition and technology, 
as well as the use of low-cost, local organizations for outreach will have to play a much 
greater role in any such strategy. 
4.2.3  Government Debt Management 
As mentioned earlier, a key issue confronting the government securities markets is that the 
central bank is also the manager of public debt in the country, which leads to a series of 
conflicts. There is a strong international consensus that a well-run economy should have a 
dedicated, consolidated public debt manager and that  the  central  bank should not, in 
general,  perform this role. A number of expert committees have commented on the 
undesirability of burdening the RBI with the task of selling bonds for the government. Both 
the HPEC on MIFC and the CFSR emphasize the need for creation of an independent Indian 
“debt management office (DMO),”operating either as an autonomous agency or an office 
under the Ministry of Finance.
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4.2.4  Framework for Institutional Investments 
 The separation of debt and monetary management would 
provide the central bank the necessary independence in monetary management, with neither 
the need to provide credit to the government nor the responsibility to ensure that government 
borrowings are incurred at low cost. A vibrant government securities market requires the 
professional capability of an independent DMO for engaging with the market, building a long-
term relationship with investors, and obtaining money from the market at a good price. The 
objective of the independent DMO should be to minimize the medium- to long-term cost of 
the debt,  with due regard for  the risks in the debt portfolio, aside from promoting 
development of the domestic debt market. Thus a DMO would set the stage for 
modernization of the bond markets and establishing of the bond-currency-derivatives nexus, 
complementing the strategy for financial sector reforms in the country. 
Various segments of the financial markets can develop and thrive only when participation in 
them is not artificially constrained. The most successful parts of Indian finance at present are 
those in which noninstitutional participants have taken a lead and engaged in speculative 
price discovery. This large mass of retail participation in financial markets is a unique edge 
that India has when compared with other international financial markets. However, 
considering that India is striving to develop Mumbai as an international financial center, the 
capabilities and strengths of institutional investors also need to be harnessed. This class of 
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investors brings with them sophisticated analytical tools in quantitative trading systems, 
pools of capital, and the potential to help link Indian finance with the rest of the world. Thus 
the strategy should be to remove the constraints on the institutional sector to allow them to 
reap the benefits of financial market innovations and in turn assist these markets with depth 
and liquidity. The regulators should move gradually to a “prudent man” principle where the 
institutional investor is allowed to exercise judgment based on what a prudent man might 
deem to be appropriate investments. 
4.2.5  Competition 
Lack of sufficient competition in parts of the financial services industry, the pervasiveness of 
public ownership, and overcompartmentalization of subsectors have resulted in suboptimal 
performance by existing market players. Competition needs  to be across larger, more 
capable players rather than among a plethora of small, weak, undercapitalized players that 
cannot capture economies of scale or make the kinds of investments in people, training, 
technology,  and research into product development that supports innovation. The Indian 
financial sector needs a wave of consolidation—through acquisitions and mergers among 
private and publicly owned institutions—for its financial firms to be strong enough to compete 
as aggressively as they should with each other, and with foreign firms, in Indian and global 
markets. A license to operate in a certain area of Indian finance is, all too often, a safe 
sinecure with stable profits and a near-zero probability of death. There is therefore little 
incentive to innovate to remain competitive. This is not unlike firms in the real economy 
before 1992. For a shift into a high-innovation regime, both carrot and stick are required. The 
stick would be the introduction of competition: entry barriers in domestic finance and 
protectionism need to be removed. The carrot would be the significantly reduced cost of 
innovation that would result from a different regulatory attitude and approach. In addition, a 
shift from a domestically focused to an internationally focused financial sector would induce 
the associated carrot of enormously larger market size. 
4.2.6  Financial Stability 
The CFSR has especially touched upon the goal of improving financial stability as an 
important reason for pursuing financial sector reforms. Financial stability is the key to sound 
functioning of the financial markets and the economy itself. By definition, this is a 
multiagency function. Though not explicitly located by law in any agency, the task of 
maintaining financial stability in India, at the moment, lies with the interregulatory body know 
as the HLCCFM (High-Level Coordination Committee on Financial Markets). It is chaired by 
the governor of the central bank and has members from other regulatory agencies. This 
committee has no legal backing and hence lacks powers of enforcement. 
There is also a general feeling that more needs to be done on regulation and supervision of 
financial conglomerates. As was evident during the recent global crisis, any financial firm 
whose combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to 
financial stability, if it failed, should be subject to robust consolidated supervision and 
regulation. The CFSR report also notes that as financial conglomerates begin to dominate 
the system, a consolidated system of supervision becomes more important.
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All this points to the need for improved interregulatory coordination and for strengthening 
and consolidating regulatory structures to deal with large, complex, systemically important 
financial conglomerates, on the one hand, and with the needs of the consumer, on the other. 
It is important to examine practices that are evolving in other jurisdictions and formalize a 
structure for handling issues of financial stability. 
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4.2.7  Strengthening Interregulatory Coordination 
The recent global financial crisis has drawn a lot of attention to the role of regulatory bodies. 
The countries of the Group of Twenty have increasingly been discussing the need for greater 
coordination not only between regulatory bodies but also between member countries and 
jurisdictions as well. India has recently become a member of the Financial Stability Board 
and is striving for the membership in the Financial Action Task Force. Response to these 
international bodies has to be timely and often requires inputs from regulators at very short 
notice. As India moves in the direction of carrying out a financial  sector  assessment 
program, as per the criteria specified by international standard-setting bodies, it is in the 
interest of all concerned that the present arrangements are fortified to cater to the upcoming 
requirements. 
This point can be reiterated while looking at the issues  of anti–money laundering and 
combating financing of terrorism (AML-CFT), which cut across the entire financial system 
and require a properly coordinated approach. For example, at present AML-CFT is handled 
by each regulator in its own way. There is a need to house the coordination of this program 
with an agency that  can take a holistic view of the threats, vulnerabilities,  and risks 
associated with AML-CFT, cutting across all institutions. 
Similarly, issues such as financial literacy, regulation of financial and investment advisers, 
and reduction of products arbitrage (as in case of ULIPs and other mutual funds)  also 
require a more formal structure of interregulatory coordination than the present one. The 
case of entities like credit rating agencies is particularly interesting as they are regulated by 
one agency (SEBI),  but their ratings have an impact on the entities regulated by other 
regulatory bodies. Inadequate interregulatory coordination in this area may create 
disharmony in the system. 
The HLCCFM was a good mechanism when it was set up. However, to keep pace with 
subsequent developments, it needs to evolve with the times in order to be more effective 
because the markets that are regulated by members of the HLCCFM have dramatically 
changed since 1992. It is generally agreed that over time, markets have become more 
complex and converged,  and are becoming increasingly integrated. In the light of these 
trends, if regulators do not adopt  an integrated and holistic view, supervision  will be 
suboptimal. The aforementioned  issues,  namely, the requirement  for more organized 
interregulatory coordination, furthering of the reforms agenda, and financial stability, draw 
attention to the need for strengthening the present interregulatory coordination mechanism. 
The CFSR  has recommended setting up a financial  sector  oversight  agency (FSOA) by 
statute to focus on macroprudential as well as supervisory issues in the financial markets; 
develop periodic assessments of macroeconomic risks and risk concentrations, as well as 
risk exposures in the economy; monitor the function of large, systemically important financial 
conglomerates as well as large systemically  important financial institutions that would 
otherwise be unregulated; anticipate potential risks and initiate balanced supervisory action 
to support efforts by the concerned regulator to address those risks; and address and defuse 
interregulatory conflicts.
28
                                                 
28 Note that large, non-deposit-taking, nonbanking financial companies may borrow from both banks and mutual 
funds, and are properly an interregulatory concern, hence they would be under the purview of an FSOA. 
 Thus the FSOA will take over the work now done by the HLCCFM, 
with the advantage that it would have legal backing and the  support of a permanent 
secretariat. This recommendation is worth taking forward. ADBI Working Paper 276    Krishnan 
 
28 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Has the global financial crisis necessitated a change in India’s approach and commitment to 
financial sector development on the lines of recommendations of certain recent government 
committees? I am of the opinion that it has not. As can be seen from the discussion in the 
section of this chapter, which traced the development of various segments of India’s financial 
markets, the Indian approach to development of financial markets has focused on gradual, 
phased, and calibrated opening of the domestic financial and external sectors, taking into 
account reforms in other sectors of the economy. This continues to be the overall stand on 
reforms, even after the global crisis, though policies for the financial sector seem to be a little 
more cautious. However, given that a lot of the agenda of financial sector reforms in India 
has  consisted of  permitting formerly banned financial markets, strengthening regulation, 
plugging regulatory gaps,  and strengthening regulatory coordination, recent global 
developments in no way have diluted this agenda. 
An  important issue that is being debated at various domestic and international forums 
following the crisis is the perils of OTC products.  There is a move toward mandating a 
transparent trading framework for these products and more regulatory oversight.  India has 
always favored exchange-traded financial products over OTC products due to the firm belief 
that OTC markets carry with them large and unknown counterparty credit risks,  are not 
transparent, hinder competition, and, given all this, have systemic implications for financial 
stability. 
Among the right lessons that can be drawn from the crisis are: 
i.  Innovation in financial markets should not be strangled. However, it should be 
ensured that the complexities of new products are understood, especially if they 
are traded off exchanges, as OTC products. When widely distributed and poorly 
understood, such products are dangerous to systemic stability. 
ii.  Too much risk aversion on part of regulators  can impede growth and 
development. 
iii.  There is no perfect regulatory architecture, but institutional design needs to be in 
tune with markets and requirements. 
Inclusion, growth, and stability are the three objectives of any reform process, and these 
objectives are contradictory. With the right reforms, the financial sector can be an enormous 
source of job creation both directly as well as  indirectly,  through the enterprise and 
consumption it can support with financing. Without reforms, however, the financial sector 
could become an increasing source of risk, as the mismatches between the capacity and 
needs of the real economy and the capabilities of the financial sector widen. India has been 
a case study of how financial sector reforms can play a supporting role in the growth of an 
emerging market economy.  The challenge is how to bootstrap from these past successes to 
escalate to the next level of financial sector development, so that it can continue to support 
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